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I.

INTRODUCTION

I was intrigued by the Introduction to Mary Ann Glendon's
new book, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law: American Failures, European Challenges. The author claims that her book will
provide an opportunity to look at the evolving legal regulation of
abortion and divorce from a perspective touted as a "powerful new
method of legal interpretation."' Professor Glendon instructs the
reader that she seeks to employ a "comparative law" perspective to
examine these two areas of family law.
This comparative perspective, Glendon asserts, reveals that
the legal positions the United States has adopted on both the
abortion and divorce issues represent "extremes" when compared
with those other countries have developed. Further, a comparison
of the laws in the United States with the laws of other countries
assists in understanding and explaining this difference. As the title
to the book indicates, Glendon views the United States' solutions
to the issues involved in abortion and divorce as "failures" and believes we have much to learn from our European colleagues. Glendon concludes that in America, in contrast to most European countries, the rights of women have been protected at the expense of
fetal life, and there has been a failure to consider the difficult issues the abortion controversy presents. As for divorce, she contends that legislators and judges in the United States have implef Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School, and Director of the Family
Policy Program of The Institute for Legal Studies.
' This claim is made on the dust jacket of the book. Professor Glendon asserts that her
hope is that the methodology "will give us insight into our own situation and... occasionally help us to find . . . 'our own paths through the forest."' Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion
and Divorce in Western Law: American Failures,European Challenges 1 (Harvard, 1987).
All page references in textual parentheticals are to this book.
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mented unilateral no-fault divorce without regard to the economic
vulnerability of women and children. She is critical of our failure
to provide for dependency and to balance needs with rights.
Glendon would be more comfortable with what she interprets
as the European solutions. Abortion would be appropriate when
the woman is in "distress" or there is some fetal abnormality. Divorce would be restricted, with long waiting periods, and fault
would reenter the equation as a basis for economic and other decisions. Glendon sees these solutions as symbolically more satisfying
and as fostering ideals such as responsibility and commitment
rather than individualism and self-centeredness.
Initially, I was puzzled that Glendon chose to consider two different topics, either of which alone would have been more than
sufficient for examination through a comparative analysis. Both
subjects, of course, may be viewed as embodying moral responses
to important aspects of life involving intimacy and reproduction,
but why she paired them for purposes of this book was not clear.
Other than the fact that these are both subjects normally considered in a survey family law course, I could see no obvious reason
why and how they fit together for purposes of comparative legal
analysis.
Furthermore, asking a reader first to consider abortion alongside divorce, and then to compare the treatment of both across nations, seemed to make the task unnecessarily complicated. Describing adequately and then applying a novel and imaginative
methodology to two massive topics in order to expose the political
and moral bankruptcy of the resolutions in the United States
seemed too heavy a burden for a mere 197-page (including three
appendices, notes and an index) book.
Of course, one similarity is that the laws concerning both topics underwent extensive changes in the past two decades in almost
all the countries the book considers. These changes uniformly resulted in more liberalized state restrictions with more autonomy
for individuals. Such reforms, at least in the United States, were
the products of changing societal values that generated widespread
dissatisfaction with the expressed law. The significant similarity
between abortion and divorce to Glendon, however, appears to be
that'in both areas the United States has adopted what she considers to be extreme legal solutions that are at odds with the "widespread popular sense of how to deal with a difficult social problem
that has no good solution." (p 75) Glendon contends that "our legal vocabulary and imagination have been inadequate to the task
of telling the kind of story most Americans would want to tell
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about the sad and complex issues involved in divorce and abortion." (p 113) According to Glendon, more appropriate stories are
revealed by the comparative method.
These are indeed weighty claims to make for any methodology, and they inclined me to give both the development and application of the methodology close attention. For that reason, this review does not directly engage Glendon on the level of her
substantive preferences for resolving the abortion and divorce dilemmas. I am much more interested in how she develops and uses
comparative methodology. Unfortunately, while Glendon initially
presents the outlines of an interesting technique of legal analysis in
her description of comparative legal methodology, she fails in this
book-under the terms she herself defines-to adequately employ
this methodology. The comparisons she offers are superficial and
out of context. She does not present the content and texture of
"the law" in the various countries so as to convince the reader that
European solutions can be transplanted, and their stories translated for Americans. Ultimately, she does not deliver anything
more convincing than strongly asserted conclusory statements that
leave the reader at worst confused, and at best curious, as to what
prompted them. Our understanding of Mary Ann Glendon's perspective is enhanced, but our knowledge of the European "challenges" is not.
II.

A.

COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY

Construction of the Methodology

In her Introduction, Professor Glendon describes the evolution
of the traditional idea of comparative legal analysis. She indicates
that comparative analysis has moved from its nineteenth-century
beginnings as an undefined compilation of a variety of methods of
looking at the law to its present-day systematic study of other legal
systems. Contemporary comparative methods, we are informed,
take us beyond concentration on formal legal rules, institutions
and procedures. The modern inquiry is into how the components
of a legal system actually operate in practice.
Glendon describes the comparative methodology as one that
considers the law in its "full social and economic context." (p 4) In
addition, the application of the methodology reveals the "complex
interactions among law, behavior, and ideas, and... explore[s] the
connections between legal and social change." (p 4). Law, or the
study of law using the comparative technique, is thus understood
to be a "heuristic device" that reached its "highest form in the
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legal sociology of Max Weber." (p 4) Glendon argues that this
methodology will provide Americans with an awareness of foreign
experiences with legal reforms and will have a positive impact on
our own efforts to resolve the questions that difficult areas of social
and legal policymaking pose. Presumably, it will reveal alternative
(better) solutions to those that Americans have developed.
Glendon further expands this emphasis on the educational or
instructive potential of the comparative study of law in her rather
lengthy recounting of the dialogue in Plato's Laws between the
strangers on their way to Crete. Glendon presents this dialogue as
an argument for the value of comparative analysis. She characterizes the dialogue as focused on the educational potential of law for
the citizenry rather than on what would be the "right" law for the
state. (p 5) She notes that Plato's Athenian Stranger "continually
brings the discussion around to the classical idea that the aim of
law is to lead the citizens toward virtue, to make them noble and
wise." (p 6)
From Plato Glendon jumps to the more contemporary work of
James Boyd White and Clifford Geertz and weaves them into her
justification for use of comparative methods in the study of law.
Introducing these contemporary scholars into her analysis allows
Glendon to suggest the appropriateness of comparisons of the "stories," "visions" and "symbols" that the laws of various countries
represent. Glendon's subsequent presentation of the comparative
method of legal analysis owes much to White and Geertz.
Throughout the text she continually refers to their insights as illuminating the results of her comparative study of abortion and divorce. Glendon is enamored of Geertz's suggestion, for example,
that laws tell us "stories" about the society from which they came.
Geertz, Glendon tells us, viewed law as the "way that a society
makes sense of things," as a" 'distinctive manner of imagining the
real.'" (p 8)2 Viewing law in this way leads to two central inquiries.
First, we must focus on the manner in which legal systems characterize factual situations. Second, we must examine how legal norms
are conceived. (p 8) From a comparative perspective this focus allows us to examine differences in the stories, symbols and visions
that different legal cultures present in their laws.
Glendon tells the reader that the stories presented have a
"powerful influence not only on how legal norms are invented and
applied within that system, but on how facts are perceived and
Quoting Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology 184 (Basic Books, 1983).
2
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translated into the language and concepts of the law." (p 8) She
believes that the stories underlying the law reflect who we are,
where we came from, and where we are going. They affect our lives
as much, if not more, than the "specific rules, standards, institutions, and procedures" that compose the Law. (p 8) In this way,
she carries forward her major theme of the educational value of
law and its underlying stories, which is also her major justification
for comparative analysis. Glendon labels this educational function
as the law's "constitutive" nature, picking up on a term used by
White in his important 1985 article on language and rhetoric.'
It is at this point that one of the more problematic aspects of
Glendon's presentation (as contrasted with her application) of
comparative methodology is revealed. Even though Glendon would
appear to have been more comfortable relying on Plato, and in fact
returns to the Athenian Stranger in the last few pages of the text,
she ultimately relies on and adopts White's and Geertz's concepts
of the educational or constitutive nature of the rhetoric of law as
her fundamental argument for the use of comparative analysis.
There is a problem, however, with this matching of the classical and the modern as support for a unified vision of the educational nature of law. Glendon places on the same spectrum Plato's
notion of education, based as it is on a belief in essentialism and
the idea of a transcendental, realizable truth, and the contemporary discussions of law as rhetoric (White), on the one hand, and
law as symbolic anthropology (Geertz) on the other. This is a problematic placement to be sure.
The very introduction of the concepts of "noble and wise" in
Plato as the educational goal of law implies that some solutions are
better (nobler and wiser) than others. In this hierarchical vision,
law and, hence, the lawmaker serve the function of educating the
populace. Truth is to be discovered, moved toward, symbolized.
This is certainly one way to articulate and understand "education." It seems apparent from the very beginning of her book that
Glendon has some firm notions of what are the "right" (or at least
"better") resolutions of the problems associated with abortion and
divorce. The European solutions revealed by comparative methodology instruct Americans as to what is "noble and wise."
Both White and Geertz, by contrast, are concerned with language and symbolism and the significance of law as rhetoric. HowJames Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law, 52 U Chi L Rev 684, 688
(1985). White defines and describes the constitutive aspects of law and rhetoric at 688-89,
and the significance of stories at 696-98.
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ever, Glendon does not seem adequately to appreciate the insights
to be gained from their work. For example, she does not seem to be
aware that, for White and Geertz, the very content and meaning of
a concept such as "education" is not fixed, but is a matter of interpretation, affected by time, culture and context. For example, the
meaning of "education" may be very different when used to discuss the theories of White as contrasted with Geertz, let alone
when compared with Plato's conception of the term centuries ago.
If this is true of such a seemingly neutral term, imagine what differences in meaning and content can exist in terms such as "noble"
or "wise." The failure to appreciate that the same word may signify different realities leads Glendon to use the language and ideas
of theorists such as Geertz and White without understanding the
more radical implications of their theories.
For example, her appropriation of White's terms (e.g., "constitutive") should not obscure the fact that there seem to be important differences in the ways she and White view the constitutive
(or educational) nature of law. Glendon seems to view lawmaking
as a process involving conscientious and conscious choices of values
by lawmakers who then use law to educate the populace. This approach is much in line with Plato's vision of law. Glendon views
law as having much more of a transformative power than White, as
being instrumental in moving society from point x to point y along
some path rationally chosen because of the desirability of the values represented. In essence, her entire book is an argument that
the images we project in our laws will, and can, have a profound
impact on who we are and where we go as a society. This is an
essentialist and a utilitarian view, whereby laws operate upon people, and, thus, upon society, having a constitutive effect. Law can
be utilized to construct and implement what is "noble and wise."
By contrast, both White and Geertz assert that the reality is
in the expression of the rule, that there is no meaning outside of
representation, no objective truth to be discovered, realized and
represented. Further, insofar as such representation constitutes
"reality," that reality is itself embedded and integrated into a web
of concurrent realities that are also expressed rhetorically. In other
words, White and Geertz question whether it is possible to make
an objective assessment as to what is unchangingly "true" or expresses the "noble and wise" value. White expresses this idea in
this way:
Both the lawyer and the lawyer's audience live in a world in
which their language and community are not fixed and certain
but fluid, constantly remade, as their possibilities and limits

1988]

Contexts and Comparisons

1437

are tested. The law is an art of persuasion that creates the
objects of its persuasion, for it constitutes both the community and the culture it commends.
This means that the process of law is at once creative and
educative . . . both the identity of the speakers and their
wants are in perpetual transformation... the law cannot be a
technique . . . by which "we" get what we "want," for both
"we" and our "wants" are constantly remade in the rhetorical
4
process.
One cannot make the leap from Plato to White and Geertz as
Glendon does without a considerably longer explanation of how
these theorists work together.5 Their positions, far from supporting
each other, seem to undermine each other and cannot be used as
support for the same method or theory. Geertz, for example, is an
anti-Platonist who challenges the whole concept of essentialism or
truth as a transcendental, discoverable, universal reality.' Since
White's work is rooted in an appreciation of context-factual and
specific differences that produce reality more than they allow for
its discovery-he also challenges such beliefs. It is possible to interpret both of these scholars as focusing on "education," although
within the context of their work it would seem that the task of
education is not the same as Plato's, namely to instruct or reveal
what is "noble and wise." Rhetoric does not reveal reality, it is
reality, representing to Geertz and White an aspect of the community and society. The education provided in this manner is sociological or anthropological. Education occurs in confronting the reality that constitutes the rhetoric of law. This is a far different
perception from Glendon's. She asserts the ability (and desirability) of the law to embody an abstract and objective moral principle
that can be used to educate society.
These observations about Glendon's construction and presentation of comparative methodology lead to consideration of a second serious problem with Glendon's book, that of application. She

White, 52 U Chi L Rev at 691 (cited in note 3).
Glendon merely states that "recently a few American scholars have begun to talk
about looking at law in a way that would not have sounded entirely strange to Plato" as a

way of introducing White's ideas about law as rhetoric. She describes Geertz as presenting a
"related invitation or challenge directed specifically to comparatists." (p 8)
' The juxtaposition of Plato and Geertz is particularly interesting. Geertz is recognized
as one of the major proponents of an anti-Platonist view, asserting that there is no essential
or inherent meaning to rhetoric and, hence, no value in the Platonist's search for a transcendent reality. Richard A. Shweder, The How of the Word, NY Times Book Rev 13 (Feb 28,
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fails to employ, on its own terms, the comparative method she herself develops from the work of Geertz and White.
B. Application of the Methodology
One promising aspect of Glendon's initial description of comparative analysis is that it supposedly places the things considered
in context. (p 4) This emphasis on context is consistent with feminist methodology and other methods or theories that look beyond
broad abstractions to the details of expression and experience. Unfortunately, Glendon's book fails to take context seriously. That
the consideration of the- topics is superficial and not in context is
evident from the coverage of twenty countries and two broad and
complex areas of relation regulation in 142 pages of text and
thirty-two pages of footnotes. What is missing is context. All that
she compares are some abstract doctrinal representations. Although touted initially, in Glendon's hands the grand tool of comparative analysis ultimately is no more than a device to string together a superficial collection of incomplete doctrinal strands torn
from the complex fabric of laws in a variety of countries. Comparative analysis seems a subterfuge, a way to obscure the presentation
of political or moral positions, to cloak them with a mantle of objectivity. The author in this way does not have to explain why or
how she reached her conclusions and, thus, can avoid responsibility
for them. Cut free of context, moral or political preferences are
presented as absolutes, not as interpretations, their existence alone
substituting for an explanation of why and how they are
7
warranted.
Looking at the work of White and Geertz, however, one would
not expect comparative analysis to resort to segmented, disembodied doctrinal expressions used to bolster a political or moral
I cannot resist pointing out that Glendon's treatment of substance is as problematic
as her treatment of methodology. In neither instance is her exploration put in context. For
example, Glendon states that the doctrinal law of Belgium, although severe on its face,
nonetheless in practice sometimes makes it easier to obtain abortions than the superficially
more lenient laws of West Germany. She avoids any issues such an observation might raise
by asserting that the "main purpose of the inquiry here, however, is not to ascertain how
easy or difficult it is for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion. It is rather to examine
the messages about such important matters as life and liberty, individual autonomy and
dependency, that are being communicated both expressly and implicitly by abortion regulation." (p 15) Glendon does not explain why a "law in action" perspective, one which considers how the law operates in practice, is not as significant as the purely doctrinal presentation. Nor does she consider why practice is not considered an essential part of
communication in a comparative scheme-why what happens in practice does not represent
an important part of the message delivered by the law in a society.
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preference. Rather, one would hope that comparative analysis
would embody the complexity and fullness of the expression of
law. Comparisons should be of laws placed in context. Consider
this quote from White:
Like law, rhetoric invents; and, like law, it invents out of
something rather than out of nothing. It always starts in a
particular culture and among particular people. There is always one speaker addressing others in a particular situation,
about concerns that are real and important to somebody, and
speaking a particular language. Rhetoric always takes place
with given materials. One cannot idealize rhetoric and say,
"Here is how it should go on in general.". . . [R]hetoric is always specific to its material.8
For comparisons to be beneficial it is necessary for the laws
compared to be discovered, translated, accessible and understood.
There are always dangers in comparisons, particularly if one's
knowledge of the things to be compared is not symmetrically complex. Comparative legal analysis based on White's insights must
begin with an exploration of whether or not there are enough contextual similarities in the problems confronted. In addition, a consideration of the practical and material, cultural and societal limits
placed on solving such problems would seem essential before one
could make a generalization that would be instructive across nations. Comparative analysis would have no "educational" value,
even in Glendon's terms (as applied or symbolic morality), if one
were comparing apples and oranges. For comparative analysis to be
effective it must explore context and consider the similarities and
differences between the contexts being compared. It must make
sure that even though the species is different, nonetheless, it is apples at which we are looking.
Another way of presenting the same point is to consider the
question of constraints. Geertz, for example, noted:
[C]ulture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns-customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters-as
has, by and large, been the case up to now, but as a set of
control mechanisms-plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what
computer engineers call "programs")-for the governing of
behavior. [Also] man [sic] is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin con...

0 White,

52 U Chi L Rev at 695 (cited in note 3).
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trol mechanisms, such cultural programs, for ordering his [sic]
behavior.'
Whether we can understand constraints or limitations, and
thus interpret reality, is dependent on context. Without context
there is no meaning:
If anthropological interpretation is constructing a reading of
what happens, then to divorce it from what happens-from
what, in this time or that place, specific people say, what they
do, what is done to them, from the whole vast business of the
world-is to divorce it from its applications and render it vacant. A good interpretation of anything-a poem, a person, a
history, a ritual, an institution, a society-takes us into the
heart of that of which it is the interpretation."0
Comparative analysis informed by context, consistent with
White's and Geertz's insights, should at a minimum explore the
cultural foundations of the societies to be compared-the beliefs
and values that give it direction-and the institutions that are the
social-structural and political instruments through which such values are expressed.-1 It seems to me that there are, at a minimum,
two different contexts for the abortion and divorce comparisons
that Glendon should have considered. First, she should have provided both political and historical information about the various
countries to place their laws in context. In addition, she should
have provided social and legal information about these countries.
Glendon discusses neither who the major political actors were
nor how their ideas and values might have affected the reforms in
the countries she compares with the United States. Such information would not only have enriched the chapter on abortion, for instance, but seems essential to the presentation and understanding
of the abortion stories from other countries she asks us to consider
and compare.' 2 France, a country whose laws on abortion Glendon
I Clifford

Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 44 (Basic Books, 1973).
'0 Id at 18.
" Geertz introduces this two-tiered method of inquiry as the appropriate way of discovering the "reality" of Bali society. Id at 331.
12 In the text I focus on the abortion discussion, but Chapter Two, which deals with
divorce, has the same problems. Context is missing in Glendon's discussion of divorce.
There are no descriptions of the societal and political cultures, and no identification of the
political actors.
In her divorce chapter Professor Glendon utilizes the comparative method to argue for
a system of different rules to govern divorces in marriages with children. Decades ago the
legal classification of two types of marriage was proposed by Judge Ben Lindsey. See the
description in Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on
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cites with approval, has a large Catholic population. It also has a
unique feminist discourse and literature that has helped to articulate the cultural reality of French motherhood and female sexuality. Glendon could have profitably compared and contrasted this to
the rhetoric and ideas that women have developed in the United
States. Neither the religious nor the secular interest groups, certainly sources of conflicting stories about abortion, are even mentioned. Yet their realities are essential to our understanding and
should have been integrated into the discussion of the changes of
the doctrinal rules that occurred. Is it that Glendon does not believe that interest groups have had any impact on abortion reform,
or is it that she views the concerns and content of these interests
as being the same across these cultures? Either conclusion we
should question."3
Also missing is a discussion of the more basic political cultures
of the nations she compares. Certainly the concept of "state" is
different in France with its more homogeneous population and spe-

Non-Marital Cohabitation,1981 Wisc L Rev 275, 319-20. More recently Judith Younger has
suggested more restrictive divorce rules for couples with children. Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together With Criticism and
Suggestions for Reform, 67 Cornell L Rev 45, 90-94 (1981). None of these plans seems to
have amounted to very much, and there is no indication in Glendon's book that such rules
exist in other countries. She feels that "children's interests" should come first, but doesn't
tell us how such different treatment works.
The superficiality of Glendon's treatment of the topic is also evident in her suggestion
that custody battles may be resolved by resort to a "primary caretaker" rule. This should
have been considered in the context of some of the criticisms of such a rule. Feminists, in
particular, have been quick to note that such a rule deepens the stereotypical presentation
of women as stay-at-home caretakers with the result that women who deviate from that
model may suffer by losing custody of their children even when they perform virtually all
the parental caretaking after work. Given that a majority of women now hold jobs outside
the home, this is a point well worth discussing when one is proposing solutions or offering
suggestions for reform. See, Martha L. Fineman, Dominant Discourse, ProfessionalLanguage, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 Harv L Rev 727, 770-74
(1988).
" Glendon does tack on a few pages of text on abortion as a "women's issue" (pp 5052), but this section does not contain a discussion of either the political or theoretical implications of the realization that it might be a woman's issue. This section rapidly reduces
itself to a rather superficial consideration of the tired themes presented in Carol Gilligan, In
a Different Voice (Harvard, 1982), without considering that the way women talk about the
abortion issue might have some impact on the way that the various societies perceive the
issue. Glendon's failure to address the differences in feminist thinking across the cultures
implies either that feminist rhetoric is irrelevant, or that there are no significant differences
among feminists from countries such as France as opposed to those from the United States.
Either of these conclusions would be inaccurate. See generally, Claire Duchen, ed, French
Connections: Voices from the Women's Movement in France (Univ of Mass, 1987); Elaine
Marks and Isabelle deCourtivron, eds, New French Feminisms (Univ of Mass, 1980); Toril
Moi, ed, French Feminist Thought: A Reader (Basil Blackwell, 1987).
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cific historical position, from what it is in the United States. Even
in England the notion of the legitimacy of governmental involvement in citizens' day-to-day lives is received very differently from
the way it is received in the United States. In fact, some comparativists have gone so far as to assert that Americans have institutionalized their distrust of all government so that the "powers of
government are limited, divided, checked, and balanced," in contrast to the English system which is a "well integrated machine in
which the various constituent parts operate with a high degree of
trust for each other's functions and role.""'
Surely this type of political context may help us to understand
and compare the laws that arise from the different cultures.
Whether regulatory government policies and officials are viewed as
helpful and performing a protective function or as the enemies of
individual liberty and freedom could help explain why some countries accept the "burdens" on the abortion decision that the
15
United States does not.
In addition to her failure to provide social and political context, Glendon neglects to give the reader any information regarding differences in legal cultures. This omission is even less understandable for a book that presents itself as a comparative legal
analysis. Glendon's presentation proceeds as though the process of
lawmaking occurs under the same conditions in all the countries
considered. She then makes comparisons of legislative products
without reference to the processes of production. Surely differences
in legal culture operate as significant constraints on the construction of law. One cannot assume that all legal cultures are the same.
In fact, other authors using comparative methodology have found
that countries as superficially similar in legal traditions as England
and the United States "differ profoundly."'"
14 P.S.Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law:
A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions 40 (Clarendon, 1987).
15 Hidden in Glendon's consideration of the abortion issue are some obscure references
to the different political cultures such as her notation that the French have a different
drafting tradition (p 129), or that on the European continent, older ideas about law survived. (pp 57, 120) But these are too scanty to provide any serious context for a consideration of the limitations or impact distinct political traditions may have had and continue to
have on the resolutions of the issues she discusses.
11 For example, Atiyah and Summers state:
First, substantive reasoning is used far more widely than formal reasoning in the
American system ... while in the English system, the reverse is true. Secondly, this
difference in methods of reasoning reflects a deep difference in legal style, legal culture,
and, more generally, the visions of law which prevail in the two countries. [We] suggest
a number of explanations for these differences, which are mostly drawn from institu-
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Glendon's last chapter makes passing reference to selected historical themes that she sees as underpinning the American notion
of individualism and the early philosophical justifications for rules.
However, this chapter does not remove my objections to her lack of
context. In fact, in some ways this last chapter is the most disappointing. It seems to have been tacked on with little expressed relationship to the laws or "stories" discussed in the earlier chapters.
It is full of generalized, sweeping statements about the nature of
individualism and the lack of community in the United States,
statements that discount the experiences of many subcultures in
American society. The section is partly historical, partly philosophical and partly pop psychology or sociology and, in my opinion,
does not remedy the glaring omissions of context in the chapters
on divorce and abortion.
III.

CONCLUSION

Context is essential to comparison, and context is what is
missing from Glendon's book. Without it the reader is compelled
to accept Glendon's interpretation (for that is all in the end that
she offers) of what the laws are and what stories are told in the
various countries.
This issue of interpretation-who interprets and what authority the interpretation carries-is significant. White and Geertz understand that multiple interpretations are possible. Without context for her interpretation we cannot get into the "heart of that of
tional, historical, and cultural differences between the two countries.
Atiyah and Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law at 1 (cited in note 14)
(emphasis in original).
At the conclusion of their lengthy and detailed comparison of the English and American
systems the authors state:
It now seems to us that legal theorists would do well to approach many of the standard
questions of jurisprudence at a lower level of abstraction, a level that at least takes
account of basic variations in the phenomena of law from system to system .... We
believe that the answers to most such questions will depend in major part upon the
degree to which a given legal system is (appropriately) more formal or (appropriately)
more substantive, matters that cannot be ascertained in the abstract. . . .It is plain
that in both England and America people use the concept of law, the concept of legislation, the concept of a judge, and the concept of precedent. But-to borrow a distinction first used by W.B. Gallie, and subsequently by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin-it seems to us evident... that, at an intermediate and at a still lower level of
generality, these phenomena do differ, even in basic ways. Accordingly, the appropriate
conceptions of these phenomena also vary. And surely the primary task of the theorist
here must be to devise conceptions and terminology which can be used to represent
those phenomena faithfully.
Id at 416-17 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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which it is the interpretation." The whole story is not conveyed. A
moral without the rest of the story, interpretation without context,
is "divorc[ed] from its application and render[ed] vacant."' 7
Glendon's conclusions are vacant. She argues that the United
States' adoption of extreme versions of solutions to the abortion
and divorce dilemmas reflects Americans' difficulty in "articulating
the richness of their personal commitments." (p 113) She also concludes that the distinct American story found in our laws is related
to other stories in our culture, those about "self-reliance, individual liberty, and tolerance for diversity." (p 114)
In the abortion context she interprets the story American law
tells as focusing on individual rights. This leads to her assertion
that the abortion decision "present[s] us with the image of the
pregnant woman as autonomous, separate, and distinct from the
father of the unborn child (and from her parents if she is a minor),
and insulated from the larger society which is not permitted even
to try to dissuade her or ask her to wait to get counseling, information, or assistance ... [and] is more distinctively American than it
is masculine in its lonely individualism and libertarianism." (p 52)
Glendon's own blindness to the rich interpretive possibilities
of comparative analysis even within our own culture prevents her
from seeing that this is only one possible American story. One
could interpret the law governing abortion in this country not as
individualistic and reflecting a lack of responsibility and commitment, but as exactly the opposite. The decision by our Supreme
Court in Roe v Wade can be seen as giving expression to the notion
of unity or continuity between mother and child. Giving women
choice rejects the troublesome, individualistic conceptualization of
a "maternal-infant" conflict that places a woman in an adversarial
role with the fetus she carries. The individualistic conceptualization is more alienating than one that assumes women act in their
own interest and that of their fetus and should be free of state
supervision and control. Looking at the American abortion story as
one that exhalts the mother-child bond, particularly in the context
of women's economic and reproductive lives, is the story I prefer-the interpretation that is my reality. And, ultimately, after
all, it is only a matter of interpretation-interpretation in context.
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